

‘HONESTIUS QUAM AMBITIOSIUS’? AN EXPLORATION OF THE CYNIC’S ATTITUDE TO MORAL CORRUPTION IN HIS FELLOW MEN*

Two important studies have recently appeared of the career and philosophy of the celebrated first-century Cynic Demetrius—an article by J. F. Kindstrand and a monograph by M. Billerbeck.¹ Both scholars discuss Demetrius’ defence of P. Egnatius Celer in AD 70.² The purpose of the present paper is threefold: (i) to argue that Kindstrand’s and Billerbeck’s interpretations of this incident, different as they are, must, like all previous interpretations, be rejected; (ii) to offer a new perspective, in the hope of showing that Demetrius’ action can be understood as thoroughly honourable; (iii) to demonstrate that Demetrius’ action can be understood as not only thoroughly honourable, but also profoundly Cynic. It may be objected that investigation of motive in such a case is intrinsically misguided. The only evidence is a short notice in Tacitus,³ and it is of course true that we shall never be able to say for certain what Demetrius’ motives were. Some modern historians, moreover, deprecate on principle analysis of motive, in the ancient world especially. It seems, nevertheless, both legitimate and worthwhile to attempt to understand the reasons why Demetrius, a Cynic philosopher of (on the normal view) high moral character, should have defended Celer, a Stoic philosopher who (again on the normal view) had revealed himself to be a complete scoundrel. The exercise may also serve to bring out some fundamental points about the Cynics’ conception of man and their interpretation of human weakness. For reasons which will become clear below Cynicism was vulnerable to misunderstanding and misrepresentation. Demetrius’ defence of Celer, I shall argue, provides an instructive paradigm for the correct interpretation of Cynicism. In the formulation of the argument I make three major assumptions:

- (1) that it is possible to reconstruct early Cynic doctrine in some detail;
- (2) that Demetrius’ philosophy was authentically Cynic;
- (3) that the Cynicism of the Imperial era was part of a continuing tradition of Cynicism and cannot be dismissed as merely a radical form of Stoicism, even though Cynic doctrine coincided in many respects with Stoic (because since Zeno Stoic ethics had been profoundly influenced by Cynic and because Late Stoicism in general took on an even more markedly Cynic character), and even though we can point to some Cynic texts which have been influenced in turn by Stoicism.⁴

(1) The reconstruction of early Cynic doctrine is naturally difficult. Cynic *testimonia* are comparatively few, and frequently take the form of anecdotes or *apophthegmata*. The personalities of early Cynics, especially Diogenes, were such as to inspire much apocryphal

* I am grateful to Professors G. B. Kerferd and A. A. Long for stimulating criticism of earlier drafts of this paper.

¹ Kindstrand, ‘Demetrius the Cynic’, *Philol.* cxxiv (1980) 83–98; Billerbeck, *Der Kyniker Demetrius: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der frühkaiserzeitlichen Populärphilosophie* (Leiden 1979).

² Kindstrand 96 ff.; Billerbeck 46 f.

³ Doubtfully relevant is *Schol. in Iuv. vet. ad sat.* i 33: see n. 20 below.

⁴ Stoic influence is clear on (e.g.) D.Chr. iv (n. 110 below), the Geneva papyrus (n. 112), some of the Cynic letters (cf. H. W. Attridge, *First Century Cynicism in the Epistles of Heraclitus* [Missoula 1976]; A. J. Malherbe, *The Cynic Epistles* [Missoula 1977]), and Oenomaus’ attack on prophecy and the theory of predestination

(Eus. *PE* vi 7.10–19), which exploits Stoic sense perception theory to support the argument (cf. A. A. Long, *CR* xxx [1980] 53 n. 1). But the Stoic influence is generally trivial—more a case of the use of convenient terminology or suitable *ad hoc* arguments than of change in philosophical orientation. (Diogenes himself seems to have exploited other philosophers’ theories when it suited him—cf. D.L. vi 70 with the good discussion of D. R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism* [London 1937] 216 ff.) Such works, if not ‘pure’, are *fundamentally* Cynic. It is harder to classify works like Epictetus’ *περί κυνισμού* (see n. 92) or Julian’s *Orr.* vi–vii, where sympathetic Stoics give their interpretations of the true meaning of Cynicism. Used critically, such works do seem to me to provide some useful evidence about Cynicism.

material. Moreover, since Cynicism was essentially a practical, and rather simple, philosophy, it did not produce canonical writings like other philosophical systems. It is almost certain that Diogenes and other early Cynics did write philosophical works,⁵ but if so, they seem to have lost currency quite early in the Hellenistic period. Most important, the Stoics had a vested interest in harmonising Cynic teachings, as far as possible, with their own, in order to support the claim that their philosophy derived ultimately from Socrates by the *diadoche* Socrates–Antisthenes–Diogenes–Crates–Zeno. Thus there is always the possibility that any ‘Cynic’ *testimonium* has been contaminated by Stoicism. This is demonstrable in some cases, debatable in others, and a theoretical possibility in nearly all. But total suspension of critical judgement would be wrong. There is some firm Cynic evidence: the fragments of the poems of Crates, the lengthy fragment of Onesicritus on Alexander and the Gymnosophists quoted by Strabo,⁶ and (with qualifications) the fragments of Bion of Borysthenes and of Teles of Megara.⁷ Some Antisthenic *testimonia* are also arguably important,⁸ and Diogenes Laertius preserves some authentic material.⁹ It is also possible to interpret even doubtfully historical material as, in some instances, at least *ben trovato*, hazardous though this procedure may be. And finally, it is possible in certain cases to document differences in doctrine between ‘Cynic’ *testimonia* and Stoic,¹⁰ which in itself suggests that the Cynic *testimonia* in question may be authentic. Exploitation of the Cynic *testimonia* is therefore difficult, and sometimes involves judicious recourse to ‘cumulative argument’, but the reconstruction in some detail of early Cynic doctrine is not impossible.¹¹

(2) Since the main source for Demetrius’ philosophy is Seneca, there are problems in disentangling Demetrian material from Senecan. But although some cases remain controversial, the work of Dudley, Kindstrand, and above all Billerbeck has shown that Demetrius’ philosophy was authentically Cynic, at least in the sense of later Cynicism.¹²

(3) This assumption being far more controversial, I relegate formal discussion to an appendix, while hoping that the material in the main body of the paper will help to demonstrate the basic continuity of Cynicism from the fourth century BC to the first century AD.

I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE TRIAL OF CELER

The historical background is well known and has been much discussed in connexion with the so-called ‘philosophical opposition’ to the emperors, but since treatment of the problem of Demetrius’ defence of Celer must take it into account, I summarise it briefly.

P. Egnatius Celer was a friend of Barea Soranus, the friend of Thræsea Paetus. All three men were Stoics and Celer had been Soranus’ teacher in philosophy.¹³ Soranus and his daughter were tried for *maiestas* in 66. There were three charges: (1) that Soranus had been a friend of Rubellius Plautus; (2) that he had planned a revolt in the province of Asia; (3) that he and his daughter had consorted with *magi*. Despite their former friendship Celer appeared as a witness for the

⁵ For Diogenes see K. von Fritz, *Philol. Supp.* xviii.2 (1926) 55 ff. The objections of Tarn and others lack force: cf. J. Ferguson, *Utopias of the Classical World* (London 1975) 89 f.

⁶ Str. xv 1.64–5 = Onesicr. *FGrH* 134 F 17.

⁷ Bion: Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes* (Uppsala 1976); Teles: O. Hense, *Teletis Reliquiae*² (Tübingen 1909), E. N. O’Neil, *Teles: the Cynic Teacher* (Missoula 1977). Qualifications are necessary because although both writers are broadly Cynic their work is clearly a dilution of Diogenes’, or even Crates’, teaching, and also shows (I think) some Stoic influence.

⁸ The ancient tradition that Diogenes was Antisthenes’ pupil was effectively refuted by Dudley (n. 4) 1 ff. (pace R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King* [Uppsala 1948] 10 ff.), but Antisthenic influence upon Diogenes

has been widely accepted, and is patent (cf. esp. Xen. *Smp.* iv 34 ff.).

⁹ Cf. esp. Höistad (n. 8) 16 ff.

¹⁰ Cynic and Stoic attitudes to (e.g.) prophecy, political activity, and the meaning of the maxim *κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν* are characteristically different, even if individual Cynics and Stoics do not always adopt the characteristic positions of their respective philosophies.

¹¹ The basic works on Cynicism are the books of Dudley (n. 4) and Höistad (n. 8). At the time of writing I have not seen H. Niehues-Proebsting, *Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus* (Munich 1979).

¹² Dudley (n. 4) 125 ff.; Kindstrand (n. 1) 89 ff.; Billerbeck (n. 1) *passim*.

¹³ Tac. *Ann.* xvi 32.3; Juv. iii 116 f.; Cass.D. lxii 26.2.

prosecution (according to Tacitus he had been bribed) and Soranus and his daughter were found guilty and condemned to death.¹⁴ Soranus was, of course, only one of many men of a philosophical disposition to be persecuted (for whatever reasons) under Nero. On Nero's death the position of the *delatores*, whose activities had greatly contributed to the abuse of the *maiestas* law in the latter part of the reign, became a major political issue. Prominent senators, like the Stoic Helvidius Priscus, the son-in-law of Thrasea Paetus, and other associates of the 'philosophical martyrs', like the distinguished Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus, wanted the *delatores* punished. In addition, the accession of Vespasian seems to have inspired some philosophically-minded politicians with the naïve hope of investing the new emperor with some of the characteristics of 'the good king'. Furthermore, there was a widespread desire among independently-minded senators to reclaim the senatorial *auctoritas* and *libertas* so seriously eroded by the Julio-Claudians in general and Nero in particular.

The lead was taken by Helvidius Priscus. Helvidius had been banished from Italy in 66 because of his relationship with Thrasea Paetus and returned to Rome under Galba, when he brought charges against Epirus Marcellus, the most notorious *delator* of all, who had informed against Thrasea. This action split the senate, Galba's attitude was ambiguous, and Helvidius was persuaded to drop the attack.¹⁵ When Vitellius became emperor Helvidius quarrelled with him in the senate for reasons that are unclear.¹⁶ On the day when the imperial power was voted to Vespasian Helvidius clashed with Marcellus over the question of the composition of the senatorial delegation to be sent to the new emperor.¹⁷ When the consul designate proposed that the question of a reduction in public expenditure be left to Vespasian, Helvidius argued that this was a job for the senate. He also proposed that the Capitol should be restored at public expense, with the assistance of Vespasian.¹⁸ None of these proposals of Helvidius came to anything.¹⁹

It was now that Musonius Rufus attacked Celer. The trial was an important test case from several points of view. It formed the back-drop to the continuing power struggle between Helvidius and Marcellus and it was intended to herald a general attack upon the *delatores*. Moreover, it had obvious implications for the problem of the relative status of emperor and senate. Celer, who did not defend himself, was defended by Demetrius in his only known appearance in a Roman court of law.²⁰ Celer was condemned. Tacitus comments (*Hist.* iv 40.3):

Sorani manibus satis factum. Insignis publica severitate dies ne privatim quidem laude caruit. Iustum iudicium explesse Musonius videbatur, diversa fama Demetrio Cynicam sectam professo, quod manifestum reum ambitiosius quam honestius defendisset.

We are now in a position to attempt to answer the question: why did the great Cynic Demetrius, the friend of Thrasea Paetus and presumably also of Musonius Rufus, defend Celer, the Stoic who had apparently betrayed his pupil Barea Soranus?

II. PREVIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF DEMETRIUS' BEHAVIOUR

Before Kindstrand's and Billerbeck's discussions various suggestions had been made.

Dudley admits puzzlement, but suggests that Demetrius was motivated by a sense of fairness: 'Celer lacked the skill or the nerve to defend himself, and however guilty, had a claim to be represented.'²¹ Toynbee offers a more detailed, though equally tentative, reconstruction: 'we

¹⁴ Tac. *Ann.* xvi 21.1, 23.1, 30.1-33.2; Cass.D. lxiii 26.1-3.

¹⁵ Tac. *Hist.* iv 6.

¹⁶ Tac. *Hist.* ii 91.

¹⁷ Tac. *Hist.* iv 6 ff.

¹⁸ Tac. *Hist.* iv 9.

¹⁹ I hope that this summary is suitably uncontroversial. For authoritative discussion see P. A. Brunt, *PBSR* xliii (1975) 7-35, esp. 28.

²⁰ Roman advocates were not jurists or lawyers as

such and could come from any social class in theory (cf. F. Schulz, *History of Roman Legal Science* [Oxford 1946] 43 ff., 108 f.). The suggestion sometimes made that *Schol. in Iuv. vet. ad sat.* i 33 ('Demetrium causidicum dicunt, qui multos Neroni detulit') refers to our Demetrius may or may not be right, but even if it is, the allegation can only rest on hostile interpretation of Demetrius' behaviour in 70.

²¹ Dudley (n. 4) 134.

can only explain it as a case, possibly, of the proverbial “cussedness” and perversity of the Cynic extremists, here reacting against the official and respectable Stoicism represented by Musonius, the defender of monarchy. Such “cussedness” would, indeed, be all of a piece with Demetrius’ conduct in the next and final scene in his career—his collision with Vespasian in, or soon after, 71.²² Koestermann finds the explanation of Demetrius’ conduct in a ‘falsch verstandenem Korpsgeist’.²³ Griffin thinks that Tacitus’ wording may indicate that Demetrius, an eloquent speaker, may have hoped to achieve a rhetorical *tour de force*.²⁴

None of these interpretations is attractive. Dudley does not develop his case, and both Koestermann and Griffin attribute to Demetrius a relatively trivial motivation. Of course people—even philosophers—may do things for trivial motives, but before we attribute such motives, it is fair to look for some more creditable explanation, especially if they are well-respected philosophers, and perhaps particularly if they are Cynics, since Cynicism, to a degree greater than any other ancient system, demanded the unity of philosophical theory and philosophical practice.²⁵

Toynbee’s reconstruction requires careful consideration. The validity of her general thesis that Stoics and Cynics had profoundly different attitudes to monarchy as an institution is too large a question to discuss here.²⁶ Kindstrand argues that Toynbee’s reconstruction is in any case self-contradictory: ‘P. Egnatius Celer was a Stoic, like Musonius, and had acted in the emperor’s interest. According to Toynbee’s interpretation we should expect to find them on the same side, with Demetrius acting as prosecutor.’²⁷ But this criticism seems crude. Celer had indeed acted on behalf of an emperor, but the emperor was Nero, who might fairly, and certainly by serious philosophers, be regarded as a tyrant, so that there would be no inconsistency in an attack by Musonius, upholder of monarchy though he was, on one of Nero’s collaborators. On the other hand, the apparent implication of Toynbee’s reconstruction—that the condemnation of Celer was desired by the Flavians—seems questionable. It is true that Vespasian had been a friend of Soranus,²⁸ but the whole senatorial campaign was against the interests and wishes of the Flavians, as they soon indicated, and it is more likely that they were prepared to let the trial and condemnation of Celer go by default as a sop to senatorial sentiment than that Musonius should be regarded as actively representing the Flavian point of view. Moreover, Toynbee’s reconstruction seems in general too schematic. None of these interpretations, therefore, seems satisfactory, although, as I shall argue, there may be elements of truth in all of them.

Kindstrand’s approach appears more rigorous. He starts from the proposition that Demetrius must have acted in what he felt to be a just cause, and then follows R. S. Rogers²⁹ in inferring that Demetrius defended Celer in the knowledge that the accusations made against Soranus were true. The consequences of this approach, however, seem to make it highly implausible.

The initial contention, that Demetrius, a man of sterling moral character—to judge at least from Seneca’s evidence³⁰ and Demetrius’ association with Thræsea Paetus—must have acted in what he considered to be a just cause, is reasonable enough. No student of human nature will deny that a man of virtue may sometimes commit a wrong act, unless virtue be so defined as to

²² J. M. C. Toynbee, *G&R* xiii (1944) 53.

²³ E. Koestermann, *Cornelius Tacitus: Annalen, Buch 14–16* (Heidelberg 1968) 407.

²⁴ M. T. Griffin, *Seneca: a Philosopher in Politics* (Oxford 1976) 312 n. 2.

²⁵ Hence the ancient dispute whether Cynicism was a *αἰρεσις* or merely an *ἔνστανσις βίου* (D.L. vi 103).

²⁶ The thesis has not won widespread acceptance (cf. Kindstrand [n. 1] 97), but is broadly endorsed by A. Momigliano, *JRS* xli (1951) 148 f. = *Quinto Contributo* ii (Rome 1975) 946 f., and Brunt (n. 19) 29 and n. 140. In my view it must be right in theory, but practice was more complex.

²⁷ Kindstrand (n. 1) 97.

²⁸ Tac. *Hist.* iv 7.

²⁹ *TAPA* lxxxiii (1952) 292 ff. Rogers’ main argument is Demetrius’ probity, but he also contends that Tacitus’ claim that the real ground for Soranus’ prosecution was his failure to punish Pergamum for resisting Acratus’ requisitions (*Ann.* xvi 23.1 f.) is refuted by chronology. But it is not necessary to convict Tacitus of ignorance or mendacity here (see Furneaux and Koestermann *ad loc.*). Even if it were, the behaviour Rogers attributes to Soranus would not have troubled a true Cynic—see below.

³⁰ Kindstrand (n. 1) 90; Billerbeck (n. 1) 12 ff.

exclude the possibility of moral wrong-doing. But in a case like this it is clearly right to look for a sympathetic interpretation of the act before accepting the jaundiced verdict of Tacitus (not that even Tacitus is savagely condemnatory: see below). Nor is the conclusion that Soranus was guilty as charged in itself untenable. His friendship with Rubellius Plautus is certain, and if he did nothing to restrain the inhabitants of Pergamum from resisting the depredations of Nero this could indeed be considered an act of *maiestas*. Moreover, he and his daughter (Dio), or his daughter alone (Tacitus), had consulted *magi*. But to say that Soranus was guilty as charged, i.e. in a legal sense, is not to say that he was morally guilty. He had been a friend of Rubellius Plautus, but the condemnation of Rubellius Plautus had itself been an act of flagrant injustice.³¹ And from a moral point of view his refusal to coerce the people of Pergamum was wholly commendable: had he coerced them, he would have been condoning the rapacity of the tyrant Nero. Finally, both Tacitus and Dio provide more or less reasonable *apologiae* for the consultation of *magi*. It is surely unlikely that Demetrius *qua* Cynic would have disapproved of Soranus' behaviour on political grounds.³² As a Cynic he might well have ridiculed the dabbling in divination, but he would certainly not have believed it to be a capital offence. In effect, Kindstrand's interpretation attributes to a Cynic philosopher a concern to uphold the (perhaps) legally correct but (almost certainly) morally repulsive machinations of what he must have regarded as a tyrannical regime.³³ There is more. Kindstrand's interpretation implies that if Demetrius was acting on behalf of a completely just cause, Musonius Rufus was doing the reverse.³⁴ Yet this is to attribute to a Stoic philosopher of high virtue, the 'Roman Socrates', nakedly dishonourable conduct. There is something wrong with the implied polarities: *either* Celer was completely innocent *or* there was nothing at all to be said in his defence, and *either* Musonius *or* Demetrius had absolute justice on his side. Rather than suppose that there was nothing against Celer (a supposition contradicted by the evidence) and that Musonius was acting with an utter lack of moral scruple (a supposition inconsistent with everything known about Musonius' character), it seems better to look for an alternative, and less simple, explanation.

Billerbeck, in contrast to Kindstrand, finds Demetrius' behaviour rather mysterious, impossible to reconcile with his philosophy, and such as to cast doubt upon his reputation for absolute incorruptibility. She tentatively suggests that the explanation may lie in 'persönliche Querelen oder Animositäten gegen Musonius', whose work shows that he rejected radical Cynicism of the type espoused by Demetrius. But there is no evidence for hostility between the two men, who seem to have moved in the same circles on amicable enough terms.³⁵ Moreover, as already argued, it is methodologically better to seek an explanation for Demetrius' behaviour consonant with his reputation for moral excellence.

III. THE CYNIC JUSTIFICATION FOR DEMETRIUS' BEHAVIOUR

(i) *The meaning of Tacitus' criticism of Demetrius*

The proper starting point must be Tacitus' wording 'ambitiosius quam honestius'. Tacitus himself clearly endorses the charge, even though the 'quod'-clause is technically *oratio obliqua*.

³¹ At least on any reasonable view (*pace* Rogers).

³² I exclude the hypothesis that Demetrius was an informer under Nero—*cf.* n. 20.

³³ Epict. i 25.22; Philostr. *VA* iv 42, v 19, vii 16; Kindstrand (n. 1) 94 f. Of course the Philostratean material is highly suspect in detail: *cf.* E. L. Bowie, *ANRW* ii 16.2 (1978) 1657 ff. But, given my working hypothesis that Demetrius was a sincere Cynic, it may be regarded as *ben trovato*. Bowie 1658 suggests, indeed, that 'Demetrius might not have been uncomfortable under Neronian rule', but the evidence he adduces is (1) Demetrius' defence of Celer, and (2) the anecdote of

Lucian *de Salt.* 63, which, however, is surely fictitious (*cf.* Billerbeck [n. 1] 51 f.).

³⁴ In fact Kindstrand seems to offer two possibilities: (1) Celer was completely innocent; (2) though not completely innocent, he should not have been singled out when the greater transgressors were left alone. But his argument is loose and he evidently favours the first possibility.

³⁵ *Cf.* Rogers (n. 29) 292; Philostr. *VA* v 19 is, however, chronologically impossible (and, incidentally, untrue to Cynic thought): Kindstrand (n. 1) 88.

But what exactly does he mean? 'Honestius' presents no problem, but 'ambitiosius' has been interpreted in two slightly different ways, as referring (1) to 'ambition', or (2) to 'ostentation' or 'publicity seeking'.

That Tacitus is suggesting that Demetrius was 'ambitious', presumably in some political sense, seems unlikely.³⁶ Such 'ambition' could only have been an attempt to gratify the Flavians, but Vespasian's representatives in Rome at the time, Domitian and Mucianus, did nothing to influence the course of the trial, though they moved quickly when it seemed that a general campaign against the *delatores* was imminent. Nor does such an interpretation square with Demetrius' career under Nero, or his later outspoken opposition to Vespasian.³⁷ Further, 'ambitiosius quam honestius' would, I think, be an unlikely description of Demetrius' conduct, had it been merely and flagrantly self-seeking: from Tacitus it would surely have earned much harsher criticism. Tacitean usage also supports the second interpretation. The reference to 'ambitio' comes immediately after the description of Demetrius as 'Cynicam sectam professus' and in context one thinks naturally of the typical 'ostentation' or 'publicity seeking' of philosophers. Such a charge was often made against Stoics, in Tacitus and elsewhere, but could be made even more speciously against Cynics (below). Tacitus' phraseology therefore implies that Demetrius acted 'ostentatiously rather than honourably'. It is a criticism of Demetrius because, from Tacitus' point of view, since Celer was manifestly guilty, Musonius' course was necessarily the more honourable, and because for Tacitus 'ostentation' was itself a fault, but it falls short of total moral condemnation of Demetrius.³⁸

We must now return to the basic question: on what grounds could a Cynic philosopher of high moral character like Demetrius defend P. Celer, manifestly guilty though he was? There are, it seems to me, several grounds on which Demetrius' stance could be held to be properly Cynic.

(ii) *The Cynic style of Demetrius' intervention*

Ostentatious behaviour was a Cynic speciality. Of course it often degenerated into mere exhibitionism, but in theory it was a deliberate pedagogical device. The basic aim was to force people to recognise the meaninglessness of convention (in accordance with the Cynic principle *παραχαράττειν τὸ νόμισμα*), but there were others as well. One was simply to attract an audience. So, for example, when Diogenes found that nobody paid attention when he was talking seriously he began whistling and a great crowd gathered about him.³⁹ Another was to demonstrate a specific philosophical point. Thus on one level Diogenes' celebrated public performances of masturbation⁴⁰ were ludicrous, and deliberately so; on another they were intended to demonstrate in the most graphic manner the ease with which sexual needs, the source of such anguish to human beings, can be satisfied.⁴¹ The frequently exaggerated,

³⁶ Cf. Dudley (n. 4) 134.

³⁷ Cass.D. lxvi 13; Suet. *Vesp.* 13; Kindstrand (n. 1) 95 ff.; Billerbeck (n. 1) 47 ff.

³⁸ For other Tacitean attacks on 'ambitio' cf. *Agric.* 4.3, 42.4, *Hist.* iv 6.1. A referee objects that in *Hist.* iv 40.3 Tacitus is implying that Demetrius was unfaithful to his philosophical principles ('Cynicam sectam professus', he nevertheless acted 'ambitiosius quam honestus'). This is certainly Tacitus' view. My argument simply is that Tacitus is wrong, since to the Cynic 'ambitio' and 'honestum' are not opposed concepts: 'ambitio' is precisely the *vehicle* by which 'honestum' is advertised or performed. Tacitus, in short, does not understand Cynicism. The referee also points out that Tacitus is particularly outraged by Celer's betrayal of 'friendship' (*Hist.* iv 10) and argues that Cynicism, which set a high value on the concept of 'friendship' (see

below), could not condone such a betrayal. But I do not argue that Cynicism could *condone* such behaviour, but rather that the Cynic concept of *φιλία* on a large scale (including, in the last resort, *φιλανθρωπία* or 'friendship' for *all* men) enabled Cynics to move from simple condemnation of those who committed morally wrong acts (including the betrayal of *φιλία*) to a more understanding attitude. There are always those (like Tacitus) who misunderstand, or refuse to accept, such an attitude. It remains significant that Tacitus does not use some harsher word than 'ambitiosius': he is uneasily aware that Demetrius' action was not simply 'inhonestum'.

³⁹ D.L. vi 27.

⁴⁰ D.L. vi 69 etc.

⁴¹ D.Chr. vi 16 ff. I here assume that Dio Chrysostom is (sometimes) a good source for Cynicism, with two *caveats*: (1) some of his works are obviously more

sometimes ridiculous character of this ostentatious behaviour was itself a didactic ploy: 'Diogenes used to say that he followed the example of the trainers of choruses, for they too set the note a little high, to ensure that the rest would hit the right note.'⁴² Often these displays would put the Cynic in a humiliating or degrading position. This too was deliberate: humiliation trained the Cynic's *καρτερία* and *ἀπάθεια*, but it was also a device by which he sought to ingratiate himself with his audience.⁴³ In this we can almost compare the role of the Cynic with that of a medieval court fool. If, then, we are prepared to consider the possibility that Demetrius was philosophically serious in his defence of Celer, there is no difficulty in the fact that Tacitus describes his action as 'ambitiosius'. A man who finds the typical Stoic suicide 'ambitiosa' would certainly find Demetrius' behaviour 'ambitiosius'. Demetrius himself could have agreed with this description, but have differed from Tacitus in insisting that the 'ambitio' could be justified.

Another aspect of Cynic teaching technique may be relevant. Cynics liked to express themselves in seemingly self-contradictory paradoxes. For example, they could equally describe the Cynic way of life as a life of 'toil' or of 'ease'. This use of paradox often involved the revaluation of concepts to which they were fundamentally opposed. They would vilify such things as 'glory', 'wealth', and 'pleasure', for example, and then claim to possess them themselves.⁴⁴ Naturally this process might involve the use of pungent rhetoric, an art of which many Cynics were master.⁴⁵ This technique could be extended to discussion of men's characters. The Cynics, for example, habitually criticised Alexander the Great for being the slave of ambition and *τύφος*,⁴⁶ but Onesicritus, pupil of Diogenes, was able to present Alexander as the *φιλόσοφος ἐν ὄπλοις*, a deliberate, and paradoxical, contradiction in terms, since a Cynic philosopher by definition went without *ὄπλα* and regarded them as useless at best.⁴⁷ The attempt to 'revalue' as it were the character of the criminal Celer could therefore be Cynic, provided that something could be said in his favour. In this limited sense (but only in this limited sense) I think that Griffin may be right in suggesting that Demetrius may have hoped to achieve a rhetorical *tour de force*. Equally, such behaviour would seem to be part of the 'proverbial "cussedness" and perversity' of the Cynics emphasised by Toynbee, though Cynic behaviour at its best was never merely 'cussed'.

Finally, let us recall that Demetrius' intervention took place at a trial, at which passions on both sides must have been high. The role of the Cynic as Reconciler,⁴⁸ in both private and public spheres (a distinction meaningless to Cynics), a role which goes back at least to Crates, may well also be relevant.

The general manner, or style, of Demetrius' intervention, then, is actually characteristically Cynic. But style without content is alien to Cynicism (at least in theory). How then might Demetrius have justified his apparently shocking decision to defend the repellent P. Celer?

(iii) *The relations of the Cynic with his peers*

First of all, could Demetrius have been influenced by the fact that Celer was a *φιλόσοφος*?

relevant than others (many are not Cynic at all); (2) formal exposition of Cynic doctrine need not entail sincere or practical adherence to Cynicism. For Dio as 'Cynic' see H. von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin 1898) 245; Höistad (n. 8) 50–61, 86–94, 150–220; Moles, *JHS* xcvi (1978) 94–6; cf. also n. 110 below. The objections of P. Desideri, *Dione di Prusa: un intellettuale greco nell' impero romano* (Messina/Firenze 1978) 537 ff., and C. P. Jones, *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom* (Cambridge Mass./London 1978) vi, 49 f., seem to me misconceived in principle.

⁴² D.L. vi 35.

⁴³ Cynic self-humiliation: Höistad (n. 8) 60 f., 97, 101, 196 f.; ingratiation: Demetr. *Eloc.* 261.

⁴⁴ Cynic 'revaluation' of concepts they vilified: cf.

Kindstrand (n. 7) 65, 252.

⁴⁵ Cf. Kindstrand (n. 1) 93 and n. 45.

⁴⁶ Cynic portrayal of Alexander: see e.g. Höistad (n. 8) 204 ff.; J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch: Alexander* (Oxford 1969) lvi, 34, 179; J. R. Fears, *Philol.* cxviii (1974) 130; see also Moles, 'The Date and Purpose of the Fourth Kingship Oration of Dio Chrysostom' *Class. Ant.* (forthcoming).

⁴⁷ Str. xv 1.64 = Onesicr. *FGrH* 134 F 17; uselessness of *ὄπλα*: cf. e.g. Philodemus *περὶ τῶν Στωικῶν*, col. 14 = W. Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos* (Munich 1906, repr. Amsterdam 1965) 61. Some scholars have failed to see the paradox in Onesicritus' 'Cynic' interpretation of Alexander.

⁴⁸ Documentation in n. 73.

We may usefully begin by considering the relations of the Cynic σοφός with his fellow men.

Among men the only *φιλία* that the Cynic recognised *unequivocally*⁴⁹ was with τῷ ὁμοίῳ. It is unclear how far, if at all, P. Celer, before he was corrupted, would have been regarded by a Cynic as a σοφός. Cynic σοφία was a much more practicable ideal than Stoic,⁵⁰ but Celer was, after all, from a different school, and his luxurious way of life was very far from the Cynic way of life as strictly defined and sometimes practised. Nevertheless, it is comprehensible that a Cynic might feel a certain philosophical kinship with a Stoic in theory (because of the debt that Stoicism owed to Cynic ethics, the admiration that many Stoics felt for Diogenes, and the 'Cynic' characteristics of radical Stoics), as many Cynics obviously did in practice, particularly at this period (as e.g. Demetrius' relationship with Thræsea Paetus and Seneca). But would this sense of kinship lapse or be annulled if the σοφός lost his virtue, as Celer clearly had? In strict theory, the question should not arise, since for the Cynics, as for the Stoics, ἀρετή is ἀναπόβλητος and the σοφός is ἀναμάρτητος.⁵¹ But in practice this Cynic position, like the corresponding Stoic position, was not maintained as absolutely as the strict theory would suggest. To take a clear example: it is evident that the suicide of Heracles, the Cynic paragon of virtue, which on the face of it was an act of cowardice, posed the Cynics awkward problems, and they devised various expedients to explain, or excuse, it.⁵² Moreover, it is obvious that in practice the apparently uncompromising proposition ὁ σοφός φίλος τῷ ὁμοίῳ might be diluted in either, or both, of two ways: (1) some Cynics were prepared to extend their definition of *φιλία*. When, for example, Crates in his pleasant parody of Solon, prays ὠφέλιμον δὲ φίλοις, μὴ γλυκερὸν τίθετε,⁵³ he is clearly not restricting the use of φίλοι to οἱ ὅμοιοι in the purist Cynic sense. Demonax is even described by Lucian as φίλος . . . ἅπασιν,⁵⁴ and Epictetus claims that Diogenes (of all people!) 'loved everybody', and although as a statement of fact that claim seems somewhat remarkable, what is significant for our purposes is that in a Cynic context (which this is) it could be made at all.⁵⁵ (These two passages in fact imply that the true Cynic is in a state of *φιλία* with mankind at large; I shall return later to the question of Cynic *φιλανθρωπία*.) (2) Not all Cynics claimed that they themselves were σοφοί or even that complete σοφία was possible. Crates apparently would have made neither claim.⁵⁶ The evidence is hardly good enough to decide Diogenes' position on this question. It is true that for Diogenes, as for all Cynics, the path to virtue was 'easy',⁵⁷ but extensive ἄσκησις was necessary,⁵⁸ and it may be that Diogenes did not himself claim perfection. Alternatively, it is possible that Crates here modified Diogenes'

⁴⁹ I stress this qualification, because the Cynic did in fact recognise obligations towards others besides his ὅμοιοι, and this is an important aspect of Cynicism—see below. For the *φιλία* of the σοφός with his ὅμοιος cf. e.g. D.L. vi 105.

⁵⁰ I justify this statement, with a possible qualification, below (p. 114).

⁵¹ D.L. vi 105. The wording of this formulation may show Stoic influence (*ἀναπόβλητος* is a Stoic technical term, though *ἀναμάρτητος* is found earlier: LSJ s.v.), but the Cynics must have accepted the content on the old Socratic *per definitionem* argument.

⁵² Cf. Höistad (n. 8) 54 f., 61, 66 ff.

⁵³ Crates fr. 1.5 Diehl; Solon fr. 13 West.

⁵⁴ Lucian *Demonax* 10. In several respects Demonax' Cynicism was impure, but his basic orientation was clearly Cynic: cf. Dudley (n. 4) 158 ff. and Attridge in *ANRW* ii 16.1 (1978) 59 f. In the anecdote of *Demonax* 21 (p. 113 below) Demonax tacitly accepts the label 'Cynic'.

⁵⁵ Epict. iii 24.64. I cannot here discuss how far it is legitimate to extrapolate Cynic doctrine from Epictetus. There are contexts where it seems to me a truer

emphasis to say that Epictetus has been influenced by Cynicism than that he is working with ideas which were indeed originally Cynic but have now been transmuted into Stoic.

⁵⁶ D.L. vi 89 ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδιάπτωτον εὐρεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν ροιᾷ καὶ σαπρὸν τινα κόκκον εἶναι. 'ἀδιάπτωτος' is a Stoic technical term, so this dictum may be contaminated by the Stoic tradition (though it is possible, here as elsewhere, that such terminology derives from Antisthenes, in which case it would have been available to early Cynics independently of Stoicism), but the sentiment is consistent with what is known of Crates' humane personality. It is true that the pomegranate analogy appears in Teles (55H=O'Neil [n. 7] 63) and in Seneca (*Ep. mor.* 85.5): both reject it in favour of the more rigorous traditional Cynic-Stoic ideal of ἀπάθεια, and Seneca explicitly attributes the analogy to the Peripatetics. Moreover, Teles quotes Crates elsewhere for moderate Cynic views, but not here. But on the whole, I incline to regard the dictum as *ben trovato*.

⁵⁷ Cf. e.g. D.L. vi 70.

⁵⁸ Cf. D.L. vi 70 f.

views.⁵⁹ But, either way, it is the general point which is important. Interestingly, in the present case, Seneca's evidence indicates that Demetrius did not claim absolute 'sapientia'.⁶⁰

Thus, as a Cynic, Demetrius could have felt a certain interest in the fate of Celer, either as a *φιλόσοφος* whose *ἀρετή* had been corrupted, or simply as a *φίλος* in an extended sense. Koestermann may therefore be partly right in suggesting that Demetrius was influenced by 'Korpsgeist', though not necessarily by '*falsch verstandenen* Korpsgeist'. But he would still have had to say something in explanation, or mitigation, of Celer's behaviour.

One obvious line of justification suggests itself. Celer had played a relatively minor role in the trial of Soranus. He was merely a 'testis', whereas the prosecutor was Ostorius Sabinus. The attack in 70 on Celer, an insignificant figure, seems to have been an attempt by Musonius and his associates to 'test the water', while for the time being the great *delatores* like Eprius Marcellus were left alone. (Helvidius' direct attack upon Marcellus under Galba had failed.) It could therefore be reasonably argued that it was unjust to single out Celer.⁶¹ Dudley may, then, be partly right in implying that Demetrius was motivated by a sense of fairness, for *δικαιοσύνη* was a great Cynic concept.⁶² But there could have been more to Demetrius' defence than that.

(iv) *The relations of the Cynic with ordinary men*

I have discussed the relations of the Cynic, whether *σοφός* in the full sense or not, with his *ὄμοιοι*. The relationship and attitude of the Cynic to ordinary men present difficult problems, mostly because the evidence is defective. But I shall treat them in some detail, because they are, I think, relevant to the present case, in respect both of the Cynic's conception of his duty to ordinary men and of his understanding of human wrong-doing, and because they affect our interpretation of Cynicism at a fundamental level.

It is an idea basic to Cynicism that the true Cynic is on the one hand a solitary, self-sufficient, passionless figure (*μόνος*, *αὐτάρκης* and *ἀπαθής* are standard epithets),⁶³ but on the other hand feels a concern for other men. In itself, this is not so much an inconsistency in Cynicism as a paradox: the wise man, though *μόνος*, is not an isolated, but rather an independent, individual.⁶⁴ He himself is self-sufficient, but he may have dealings with other men—on his own terms. But who, in this context, count as 'other men'? Other wise men (or of course, women),⁶⁵ the wise man's *ὄμοιοι*, with whom he shares *φιλία*, obviously come into that category. But here an important question arises: is the category of 'other men' *restricted* to the wise? Several factors would seem to suggest this, notably: (1) the apparently absolute division among men that the Cynics made between 'the wise', who are 'few', and 'the foolish', who are 'many';⁶⁶ (2) the harsh descriptions the Cynics used of other men and of their own activities towards them;⁶⁷ (3) the Cynic doctrine *ὁ σοφὸς φίλος τῷ ὁμοίῳ*, which *seems*, with its apparent rejection of ordinary ties, to be thoroughly élitist in its implications;⁶⁸ (4) the strong Cynic sense sometimes given to the word *ἄνθρωπος*, which can be used to mean 'free man', or, in effect, Cynic 'wise

⁵⁹ So Höistad (n. 8) 128.

⁶⁰ *De Ben.* vii 8.2; perhaps also *Vit. beat.* 18.3 with M. T. Griffin, *CR* xxxi (1981) 59, though Seneca's point is there obscure.

⁶¹ So, apparently, Kindstrand (*cf.* n. 34 above).

⁶² Documentation in Kindstrand (n. 7) 214 f.

⁶³ *μόνος*: *cf.* e.g. Antisth. *Od.* 2, 8 = *fr.* 15.2, 8 Caizzi; D.L. vi 38; D.Chr. vi 60; *αὐτάρκης*: *cf.* e.g. D.L. vi 78, 104; *ἀπάθης*: *cf.* e.g. D.L. vi 2 = Antisth. *fr.* 128a Caizzi (for Antisthenes as 'Cynic' *cf.* n. 8 above). Here, as elsewhere, I follow Höistad (n. 8) 94 ff. (*cf.* also F. D. Caizzi, *Antisthenis Fragmenta* [Varese/Milan 1966] 90 ff.) in seeing serious philosophical content in Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus*. A purely rhetorical approach, as e.g. G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (London 1963) 170–2, yields little.

⁶⁴ *Cf.* J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1969) 61, correcting H. C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge 1965) 111. In what follows, however, I go further than Rist in giving a positive value to Cynic *φιλανθρωπία*.

⁶⁵ Cynicism is basically non-sexist. Rist (n. 64) 61 ff. discusses Cynic views on the relationship between the sexes excellently.

⁶⁶ *Cf.* e.g. Kindstrand (n. 7) 157, 220.

⁶⁷ E.g. *οἱ πλείστοι* are 'one finger removed from madness' (D.L. vi 35 etc.); the Cynic's activities are regularly described in such terms as *ἐλέγχω/ἐξελέγχω*, *ἐπιτιμάω*, *κολάζω*, *λοιδορέω*, *μέμφομαι*, *ὀνειδίζω*, etc.; for representative documentation see G. A. Gerhard, *Phoenix von Kolophon* (Leipzig/Berlin 1909) 35–8.

⁶⁸ This is Baldry's main argument (n. 64) 111.

man'.⁶⁹ An *ἄνθρωπος* in this sense is apparently by definition a Cynic *σοφός*. Does this mean that those who are not *ἄνθρωποι* in this sense are of no account to the Cynic, as being un- or sub-human?

But there are serious objections to the view that to the Cynics 'other men' means simply and solely 'other wise men'. There is abundant evidence to show that Cynicism was a strongly missionary philosophy,⁷⁰ and it is obviously true that in practice Cynics did not confine their teaching to 'the wise'. Indeed, so far as their proselytising was concerned, it would have been absurd to do so, since the *σοφός* by definition does not require philosophical help: once he has his *σοφία* it is a permanent possession—his *ἀρετή* is *ἀναπόβλητος*.⁷¹ Many Cynics seem to have conducted their teaching in two very different ways—both before a relatively small circle of followers and in public, before quite large crowds or any chance passer-by.⁷² In the latter case such Cynics must have been exhibiting (or at least, affecting) a concern for 'other men' in the broader sense. That this cannot be dismissed as mere inconsistency is shown by the fact that the Cynic is regularly characterised by a range of terms which necessarily imply a concern for mankind at large. Thus, for example, the Cynic is a *παιδαγωγός*, a *διδάσκαλος*, an *ἰατρός*, a *σωφρονιστής*, a *νουθετητής*, a *εὐεργέτης*, an *ἐπίσκοπος*, a *κατάσκοπος*; he 'helps' others, he 'saves' them, he can be compared to the *ἀγαθὸς δαίμων*, and he sometimes even resolves quarrels and enters people's houses for that purpose.⁷³ He is, in short, *φιλόανθρωπος*, and the *ἄνθρωποι* in this context are not restricted to *ἄνθρωποι* in the strong Cynic sense.⁷⁴ (I discuss Cynic *φιλανθρωπία* further below.)

All this seems to indicate a profound concern for the well-being of men in general, not just 'wise men'. It is true that attempts have been made to distinguish between early Cynicism, in particular the Cynicism of Diogenes, and later Cynicism, which has been argued to be a humanised, even bowdlerised, form. There is, admittedly, some justification for this. Thus, for example, when Epictetus iii 24.64 describes Diogenes as *ἡμερος καὶ φιλόανθρωπος* (where *φιλόανθρωπος* takes a 'soft' colouring from the conjunction with *ἡμερος*), we must be dealing

⁶⁹ Cf. e.g. D.L. vi 41, 60 (though note that *ἄνθρωπος* does not invariably have this connotation in Cynic texts: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 56); for the view that this implies that other men are sub-human see Baldry (n. 64) 111.

⁷⁰ The view of N. W. De Witt, *Epicurus and his Philosophy* (Minneapolis 1954) 329, that Epicureanism was 'the only missionary philosophy produced by the Greeks' (my italics) is incorrect, unless of course Cynicism is not classed as a 'philosophy' (an arbitrary contention).

⁷¹ This argument holds even though Cynic insistence on the permanence of virtue was not always rigorously maintained (above). The argument is actually used, though in a different context, by Epict. iii 22.67.

⁷² Cf. Kindstrand (n. 1) 90, (n. 7) 138.

⁷³ I give fairly full documentation of these concepts in order to show that they are integral to Cynicism and not an apologetic Stoic refinement. Of course the evidence does not permit precise dating of all these concepts and it may occasionally be possible to distinguish between Diogenian and Cratetean Cynicism (though this can easily be overdone—see below), but the general picture is clear. *παιδαγωγός*: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 75, 30 f.; [Diog.] *Epp.* 29.1, 40.5; Epict. iii 22.17; Lucian *Pisc.* 45; Gerhard (n. 67) 35; Höistad (n. 8) 125 f., 131, 138, 176 ff., 210; Kindstrand (n. 7) 209; Billerbeck, *Epiktet: vom Kynismus* (Leiden 1978) 71; *διδάσκαλος*: cf. e.g. Stob. iii 1.55; Gerhard 35 f.; *ἰατρός*: cf. e.g. Antisth. *Ai.* 4 = *fr.* 14.4 Caizzi; D.L. vi 4, 6 = Antisth. *fr.* 185–6

Caizzi; D.L. vi 30, 36; Lucian *Vit. auct.* 8; Höistad 101 f., 118 f.; Billerbeck 137; *σωφρονιστής*: cf. e.g. Str. xv 1.64 = Onesicr. *FGrH* 134 F 17; [Socrat.] *Ep.* 12 (p. 618 Hercher—Simon to Aristippus on Antisthenes); Julian *Or.* vii 213a; Gerhard 36; *νουθετητής*: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 86; Gerhard 35; *εὐεργέτης*: cf. e.g. Epict. iii 22.77, iv 6.20; M. Aurelius vii 36 = Antisth. *fr.* 20a–b Caizzi; *ἐπίσκοπος*: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 102; D.Chr. ix 1; Epict. iii 22.72; Max. Tyr. xv 9c–d; Billerbeck 136 f.; *κατάσκοπος*: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 17, 18 = Antisth. *fr.* 1 Caizzi; D.L. vi 43; Plut. *quom. adul. ab amico internosc.* 70c, *de exil.* 606c; Epict. i 24.6–7, iii 22.24; Cynic 'help': cf. e.g. Crates *fr.* 1.5 Diels; Bion *fr.* 75 Kindstrand; [Diog.] *Ep.* 29.4; Lucian *Peregr.* 33; Julian *Or.* vi 201c; Cynic 'salvation': cf. e.g. Antisth. *Od.* 8, 10 = *fr.* 15.8, 10 Caizzi; Stob. iii 13.44, iii 8.20; D.Chr. i 84, xxxii 3 (with Höistad 160); Plut. *quom. adul. ab amico internosc.* 74c, *de prof. in virt.* 82a, *de cap. ex inim. util.* 89b = Antisth. *fr.* 77 Caizzi; Cynic as *ἀγαθὸς δαίμων*: D.L. vi 74; Apul. *Flor.* 22; Julian *Or.* vi 200b (arbitrarily deleted by edd. like Hertlein and Wright); Lucian *Demonax* 63; this is perhaps a specifically Cratetean characteristic; Cynic as reconciler: cf. e.g. Xen. *Mem.* iv 64; Philod. *Rhet.* 223.12 ff. (Sudhaus) = Antisth. *fr.* 106–7 Caizzi; Str. xv 1.65 = Onesicr. *FGrH* 134 F 17; D.L. vi 86; Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 632e, cf. *Brut.* 34.5–8; Lucian *Demonax* 9, 63; Apul. *Flor.* 22; Julian *Or.* vi 201b. Cf. also Plut. *de fort. Alex.* 329c (discussed below, p. 115). The continuity of Cynic ideas over the centuries is indeed striking.

⁷⁴ Cf. n. 69 above.

with an attempt to alleviate and humanise the traditional character of Diogenes. But this line of argument can be taken too far. *φιλανθρωπία* in a broad sense is a concept already latent in Antisthenes⁷⁵ and implicit in the teaching of Diogenes,⁷⁶ and it seems to have found concrete expression in Crates' (alleged) giving of his wealth to the poor.⁷⁷ One must distinguish in this context between different aspects of *φιλανθρωπία*. Early Cynicism is not incompatible with the general concept—indeed, the Cynic's missionary zeal, which is attested from the first beginnings of Cynicism, and many of his traditional roles, the most important of which seem also to be integral to Cynicism (above), logically presuppose *φιλανθρωπία*, although it is very often not *φιλανθρωπία* in the 'softer' sense. Later Cynicism, or at least some branches of it, following the example of the humane and kindly Crates,⁷⁸ emphasised *φιλανθρωπία* in the 'softer' sense, but this is a difference of emphasis, and not of fundamentals. Concern for the well-being of one's fellow man is basic to Cynicism in all its forms, though this concern could be articulated in contrasting ways—harshly and aggressively, à la Diogenes, or humanely and benignly, à la Crates. A good example of the former type is the portrayal of Diogenes given by Dio Chrysostom in his *Orr.* iv, vi, viii, ix and x. In Dio Diogenes is the usual stern critic of the folly of mankind (a view no doubt much truer to the historical Diogenes than that offered by Epictetus iii 24.64), but his concern for the moral well-being of others is patent and a fundamental part of his philosophical activity. The essential point that even the harsh and aggressive type of Cynic must not withdraw completely from mankind at large is nicely brought out in the exchange between the fanatical Peregrinus and the humane Demonax recorded by Lucian.⁷⁹ To Peregrinus' accusation that Demonax is not a true Cynic because of the humanity and jocularly he deploys in his relations with his fellow human beings (*οὐ κινῶς*), Demonax replies that Peregrinus has taken his Cynicism to such extremes that he can no longer be counted a member of the human race (*οὐκ ἀνθρωπίζεις*).⁸⁰ It is important to realise that this is not an exchange between a Cynic and a non-Cynic about the merits of Cynicism, but an exchange between fellow Cynics (Demonax here implicitly accepts that he can be classified as a Cynic) about the real nature of Cynicism.

Thus *φιλανθρωπία* in a profound sense ('love of mankind'), as opposed to a trivial sense ('kindliness', 'gentleness') is integral to Cynicism. This conclusion has, indeed, been disputed on three main grounds, and though these grounds are inadequate, it is worth analysing them to see where the error lies:

- (1) it has been argued that Cynic *φιλανθρωπία* would be hard to reconcile with the élitism of the doctrine *ὁ σοφός φίλος τῷ ὁμοίῳ*;⁸¹
- (2) explicit attestation of Cynic *φιλανθρωπία* is slight;⁸²
- (3) some texts actually contrast the Cynic attitude to other men with *φιλανθρωπία*.⁸³

These difficulties look much more formidable than they are. (1) is a simple misconception, as I hope to show below. (2) and (3) go together. Explicit attestation of Cynic *φιλανθρωπία* is indeed slight, but in fact this proves nothing. Relative dearth of explicit attestation of a concept is not an argument against the existence of that concept, if other considerations seem to make its existence certain,⁸⁴ especially when the totality of the evidence is so defective. In any case it is easy to understand why *φιλανθρωπία* should be relatively seldom attributed to Cynics. From

⁷⁵ Cf. e.g. Caizzi 91 (on Antisth. *Od.*).

⁷⁶ As even Baldry (n. 64) 111 admits.

⁷⁷ D.L. vi 87–8.

⁷⁸ Cf. e.g. Julian *Or.* vi 201b–c.

⁷⁹ *Demonax* 21.

⁸⁰ For similar verbal jibes against Cynic/Stoic extremes cf. Plin. *Ep.* viii 16.3–4, Sen. *Ep. mor.* 99.5, and Cic. *ad Quint. frat.* ii 10(9).3 (with my note in *LCM* vii.8 [May 1982] 63–5).

⁸¹ So Baldry (n. 64) 111.

⁸² So, e.g., J. de Romilly, *La douceur dans la pensée*

grecque (Paris 1979) 211 f. For explicit references to Cynic *φιλανθρωπία* see e.g. D.Chr. iv 24; Epict. iii 24.64; Lucian *Demonax* 11; scholarly discussion and bibliography in Kindstrand (n. 7) 247.

⁸³ For useful documentation see A. J. Malherbe, *Novum Testamentum* xii (1970) 210 ff. Cf. e.g. Stob. iii 8.20 (? Demetrian—see Billerbeck [n. 1] 57 ff.).

⁸⁴ For this important methodological point (in quite different contexts) cf. e.g. H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley/London 1971) 13; T. C. W. Stinton, *CQ* xxv (1975) 251.

the fourth century onwards *φιλανθρωπία* is very often used of 'mildness' or 'gentleness', a quality not possessed by those Cynics who practised the harsher brand of Cynicism represented by Diogenes. But this does not disqualify them from being considered *φιλόανθρωποι* in the more profound sense. By the same token, a Cynic who is harsh in his criticism of mankind can in turn be criticised for lack of *φιλανθρωπία* by those who believe that gentler teaching methods are likely to be more productive, but such a Cynic may nevertheless be motivated by 'love of mankind'. The general point is elementary and was indeed widely appreciated by ancient philosophers, both Cynic and non-Cynic.⁸⁵

At this juncture, a further question arises: is there any inconsistency between these two aspects of traditional Cynicism—on the one hand the abuse, often vitriolic, of *οἱ πολλοί*, on the other the profound concern for all men, including *οἱ πολλοί*? At times there seems to be a certain awkwardness arising from these two opposing emphases, but fundamentally there is no real inconsistency, because of the Cynic view of the nature of man.⁸⁶ The Cynic *σοφός* is a man in his ideal, or perfect, state—the only true *ἄνθρωπος*. But all men, whatever their culture or background (relevant factors here are the Cynic emphasis on the absolute meaninglessness of social distinctions, their rejection of conventional *παιδεία*, and their readiness to cite the practices of non-Greek peoples as standards of what is 'good' or 'natural'),⁸⁷ have a natural endowment of *νοῦς* or *λόγος*.⁸⁸ Their *κακία* is the product of ignorance, and virtue can be 'taught'.⁸⁹ The Cynic tries to remove their ignorance and to inculcate virtue. Moreover, the acquisition of virtue is 'easy'⁹⁰—easy, admittedly, only along the lines of the Reagan aphorism 'it's simple, but it's not easy'; but it is important that Cynicism, which despised both conventional *παιδεία* and all theoretical speculation,⁹¹ was unencumbered by the intellectual impedimenta of other philosophical schools, and was indeed 'easy' in an intellectual sense. Thus on the one hand ordinary men are not the Cynic's fellow men because they are not 'real' *ἄνθρωποι*, but on the other they are the Cynic's fellow men because all men have a natural capacity for the attainment of the Cynic state, itself an 'easy' matter. All men are therefore potentially *ἄνθρωποι* in the full Cynic sense. This kind of double attitude—the emphasis on the exclusiveness of Cynicism and the Cynic claim to help mankind at large—is illustrated in many Cynic texts, but perhaps nowhere more graphically than in Epictetus' *περὶ κυνισμοῦ*.⁹² Epictetus, for example, insists vehemently on the purist Cynic definition of *φιλία*,⁹³ but his Cynic is the usual *παιδευτής*, *παιδαγωγός* (iii 22.17), *κατάσκοπος* (iii 22.24), etc., who has a strong sense of missionary duty towards his misguided fellow-men and feels *φιλανθρωπία* towards all (iii 22.81).

If, then, these arguments are sound, we must conclude that the Cynics operated a double classification of the relations between the *σοφός* and the ignorant majority: on the one hand, as a matter of empirical fact, there was a vast gulf between the two, and the ignorant majority did

⁸⁵ Documentation in Malherbe (n. 83) 208 ff.; cf. also M. W. Dickie in *Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar Third Volume 1981*, ed. F. Cairns (Liverpool 1981) 199 ff.

⁸⁶ Arguments analogous to those that follow here have of course been widely used in relation to Stoicism (and even Epicureanism), but are generally ignored in discussion of Cynicism (owing, I believe, to failure to take Cynicism seriously).

⁸⁷ Meaninglessness of social distinctions: e.g. D.L. vi 104; rejection of conventional *παιδεία*: e.g. D.L. vi 103–4; non-Greek peoples as standards: e.g. D.L. vi 73; E. Weber, *De Dione Chrysostomo Cynicorum Sectatore* (Gotha 1887) 127–33; a slightly less dismissive attitude to *παιδεία* appears in Antisthenes' doctrine of the *διττή παιδεία* (Antisth. fr. 27 Caizzi; D.Chr. iv 29 ff.; Höistad [n. 8] 56 ff.), which allowed human *παιδεία* a certain small value, but the concession was minimal, nor was this the usual Cynic view.

⁸⁸ Cynic *νοῦς*: cf. e.g. Plut. *de Stoic. repugn.* 1039e = Antisth. fr. 67 Caizzi; [Diog.] *Epp.* 34.2, 40.5; D.Chr. x 28; Cynic *λόγος*: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 24, 73; indistinguishable from these is the *γνώμη* of Max. Tyr. xxxvi 1.

⁸⁹ E.g. D.L. vi 105.

⁹⁰ D.L. vi 70 (and many other refs).

⁹¹ Cf. n. 87 above.

⁹² Epict. iii 22; how far this work is properly Cynic is of course debatable: discussion in Dudley (n. 4) 190–8 (very balanced) and Billerbeck (n. 73) 1–9; the rejection of Cynic *ἀναίδεια* and the use of some Stoic terminology excepted, there is, I believe, little that is not Cynic, although it is of course Stoic as well. Cf. also p. 123 below.

⁹³ iii 22.62 ff. (Billerbeck's comments *ad loc.* are misconceived).

not even qualify as 'men' at all; but on the other hand, there was a bond of humanity between the two classes. As with Cynic *φιλανθρωπία*, it is unfortunately difficult to cite texts which make explicit the doctrine that all men are potentially *ἄνθρωποι* in the full Cynic sense. If pressed, I would be prepared to cite a number of *testimonia* where it seems to me that the idea is strongly implied. For example, Antisthenes is reported by Xenophon as saying: 'τούτους (τυράννους) πάνν οἰκτίρω'. This 'fragment' of Antisthenes is not authentic, in the sense that it can hardly reflect Antisthenes' actual words, but it may at least faithfully reflect Antisthenes' general attitude. Its relevance lies in the fact that in Greek thought 'pity' is an emotion that depends on a sense of kinship between the pitier and the pitied.⁹⁴ More strikingly, there is the famous statement in Plut. *de fort. Alex.* 329b that the main principle of Zeno's *Republic* was *πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας*. For various reasons, many scholars have shied away from taking this statement at face value, but if it is so taken (as I believe it should be), it is highly relevant to the present discussion. Zeno's *Politeia* was heavily influenced by Cynic thought, and the formulation *πάντας ἀνθρώπους . . . δημότας καὶ πολίτας* looks essentially similar to the famous Cynic doctrine of 'cosmopolitanism': both formulations are paradoxes, in which the idea of a small political unit (the *δήμος* or *πόλις*) is deliberately juxtaposed with the idea of the largest grouping possible. The paradoxical word play is characteristically Cynic and in itself another reason for taking *πάντας ἀνθρώπους* at face value. I think it likely therefore that Zeno was here reflecting the teaching of Diogenes and Crates.⁹⁵ Finally, in this same passage of *de fort. Alex.* Alexander is described as *διαλλακτῆς τῶν ὄλων* (329c). Plutarch's argument here is that whereas Zeno's prescription was purely theoretical, Alexander actually put such precepts into practice. Thus each of Alexander's achievements is an analogue of some philosophical recommendation.⁹⁶ Now the notion of the philosopher as 'the reconciler' is very Cynic,⁹⁷ and the hypothesis that in the present context this is a Cynic analogy is supported by Plutarch's general reliance upon Onesicritus in this essay.⁹⁸ The description of Alexander as 'reconciler of the whole world' may therefore reflect a Cynic concept of the unity of mankind.

Needless to say, these interpretations are highly controversial and cannot in any case be fully

⁹⁴ Antisthenes: Xen. *Smp.* iv 37 = fr. 117.22 Caizzi; to Aristotle the arousal of pity depends on *ὁμοιότης* (*Rhet.* 1385b13, 1386a24), which is the normal Greek view: cf. in general K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford 1974) 195 ff.

⁹⁵ Zeno's *Politeia*: Baldry, *JHS* lxxix (1959) 3 ff., and (n. 64) 153 ff.; Rist (n. 64) 64 ff.; its Cynic character: D.L. vii 4 with the discussions of Baldry and Rist.

Against the 'universalist' interpretation of *πάντας ἀνθρώπους* here adopted, it has been urged that: (1) there is no evidence that Zeno held such a view (Rist 65). But this is just *petitio principii*. (2) a universalist principle would conflict with the élitism attested in D.L. vii 32–4 (Baldry). This is a misunderstanding of the Cynic-Stoic 'two-tier' classification of mankind: see M. H. Fisch, *AJP* lviii (1937) 67 ff. Nor (*pace* Fisch) need it be supposed that *πάντας ἀνθρώπους* are actual members of the state, especially if Zeno's *Politeia* describes both the ideal state and the attitude of the wise to the present (O. Murray, *CR* xvi [1966] 369). D.L. viii 32–4 can be regarded as a statement of fact, Plut. *de fort. Alex.* 329a–b of the ideal or potential (as indeed Plutarch represents it). (3) a universalist principle is incompatible with the apparent form of the *Politeia*, which was jussive or prescriptive (Baldry [n. 64] 161 ff.). This objection is met by the same argument as in (2) above.

The main suggested alternative interpretations to the 'universalist' interpretation are: (1) *πάντας ἀνθρώπους* only means 'everybody', 'all people' in a weak sense

(Baldry, *JHS* lxxix [1959] 13). This seems highly unlikely. Not only are there difficulties in devising a suitably weak application for the phrase, but this interpretation is incompatible with (a) the international character of Zeno's prescriptions and (b) the strong paradox of *πάντας ἀνθρώπους . . . δημότας καὶ πολίτας*. (2) *πάντας ἀνθρώπους* means 'all wise men' (Murray). On this hypothesis Plutarch is twisting Zeno's doctrine to suit his own argument. But this is very forced: Plutarch's wording is unequivocal: not only *πάντας ἀνθρώπους* (in paradoxical conjunction with *δημότας καὶ πολίτας*), but also *εἰς δὲ βίος ἡ καὶ κόσμος*. Rist 65 suggests instead that Plutarch's account of Zeno's wording is correct, but that Zeno was using *ἄνθρωποι* in the strong Cynic sense. Again, this seems highly implausible. Elsewhere, the context makes clear when *ἄνθρωπος* has a strong sense. If Plutarch's rendering of Zeno's wording is remotely accurate, this did not apply to Zeno's use of *ἄνθρωπος*. Rist's interpretation also fails to give full value to the paradox in Zeno's words. In sum, I believe that Fisch and others are right to take *πάντας ἀνθρώπους* as 'all human beings'.

⁹⁶ Cf. Fisch (n. 95) 66 ff.

⁹⁷ Cf. n. 73. The contention of A. B. Bosworth, *JHS* c (1980) 4, that Plutarch's interpretation of Alexander stems largely from interest in the ideas of reconciliation and fusion in the Roman Empire, seems to me to disregard the philosophical background, which is Cynic/Stoic.

justified here. So, while I believe that these *testimonia* offer some support for the arguments put forward to show that the Cynics must have believed that all men were potentially full Cynic *ἄνθρωποι*, I hope that the case may stand without the support of such controversial items.

At this juncture, I must make another important point. My whole discussion of the Cynic conception of 'other men' has been framed on the assumption that we are talking of the true Cynic, the *σοφός/ἄνθρωπος par excellence*. But if, as already pointed out, not all Cynics claimed to be *σοφοί* in the strict sense, it must follow that such Cynics would find it even easier to feel *φιλία* with mankind at large. Some Cynics must surely have taken something like the position of humane Stoics like Panaetius.⁹⁹ This attitude, indeed, may well go back as far as Crates.¹⁰⁰

I have prolonged this discussion, elementary though I fear it may be, simply in order to demonstrate that the élitism of Cynicism, which on one level is real enough, is in the final analysis less important than its 'philanthropy'. Cynicism is not just an inward-looking philosophy: the Cynic, at all phases of Cynicism, is not merely preoccupied with his own moral condition—he is also deeply concerned with the moral condition of others, even the most depraved.¹⁰¹

How might this apply to Demetrius and Celer? I have already argued that Demetrius could have been concerned with the corruption of Celer, if Celer is regarded as a *φιλόσοφος*. But in the light of the above analysis it should be clear that he could also have been concerned with the corruption of Celer, if Celer is regarded simply as the normal 'ignorant' human being. Moreover, Cynicism could have provided Demetrius with the justification not only for castigating Celer's vice but also for attempting to 'cure' it. Could it also have provided a justification for coming to Celer's defence in his time of trouble? The answer, I believe, is yes, and here again we must explore the implications of the Cynic understanding of vice.

(v) *The Cynic understanding of vice*

Vice is the product of ignorance, virtue of knowledge. In effect, the virtuous life is equated with *τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν*, and the phrase *κατὰ φύσιν* is given a very basic, primitivist, meaning, as both the practice of the Cynics and their characteristic appeals to animal behaviour reveal.¹⁰² Man must live in his natural state. Broadly speaking (and the Cynic analysis of virtue and vice was nothing if not broad) the ignorance of vice is the result of the corrupting influence of civilisation. Hence the virtuous state in Cynicism is frequently described in Golden Age terms. Man is therefore seen as fundamentally innocent, before his corruption by civilisation and all the evils it brings with it—greed, love of glory, wars, addiction to pleasures, etc.¹⁰³ By virtue of

⁹⁸ Cf. Hamilton (n. 46) xxxi. Bosworth (n. 97) 4 argues instead that Plutarch has 'totally transformed' Onesicritus' view, which was 'of an Alexander who still has sympathy for the search for wisdom even in the cares of empire', whereas 'for Plutarch Alexander not only sympathises with philosophical theories, he embodies and perfects them in his actions'. The centrality of the thesis 'Alexander philosophus' to Onesicritus' work is indeed debatable, but Fisch (n. 95) 129 ff. makes (on the whole) a good case for supposing that the thesis was not incidental but expounded at length and illustrated in several different contexts. (Even in Strabo Alexander is *φιλόσοφος ἐν ὄπλοις*, i.e. 'he embodies and perfects philosophical theories in his actions'.) Note too that in Str. xv 1.65 the Gymnosophists are seen as reconcilers.

⁹⁹ Cf. especially Sen. *Ep. mor.* 116.5 = fr. 114; discussion in Rist (n. 64) 187 ff., 213 ff.; Griffin (n. 24) 179 ff.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. n. 56.

¹⁰¹ Cf. especially the Christ-like sentiment of Antisthenes: D.L. vi 6 = fr. 186 Caizzi (similarly Stob. iii

13.43 [Diogenes]). Such a 'fragment' may of course not be authentic, but is at least consistent with Antisthenes' *persona* in Xenophon (cf. Xen. *Smp.* iv 37 = fr. 117.22 Caizzi, discussed above p. 115 and n. 94).

¹⁰² E.g. D.L. vi 71; appeals to animal behaviour: D.L. vi 22; D.Chr. vi 22, etc. Many scholars have failed to realise how far the Cynic identification of the 'good' life with life 'according to nature' depended upon the primitivist ideal. It is not true that Diogenes 'does not tell us what virtue is' (Rist [n. 64] 59): the Cynic answer to the question is (no doubt) inadequate, but it is explicit.

¹⁰³ Basic texts for this kind of reconstruction: D.L. vi 44; Str. xv 1.64 = Onesicr. *FGrH* 134 F 17; D.Chr. vi 22 f.; [Diog.] *Ep.* 32.3; Lucian *Fug.* 17; Max. Tyr. *Or.* xxxvi; discussion in P. Vidal-Naquet, *JHS* xcvi (1978) 135. More generally relevant are the fragments of Diogenes' *Πολιτεία* (conveniently, if carelessly, discussed by Ferguson [n. 5] 89 ff.) and Crates' *Pera* (best discussion in Höistad [n. 8] 129 ff.).

their natural endowment of *νοῦς* all men have the potential of achieving true self-knowledge,¹⁰⁴ that is, the knowledge of the essential nature of man, and of 'stripping off' the corruption wrought by civilisation and returning to their natural state.¹⁰⁵ Now this view of man ought to mean that the Cynic could take an understanding, if not an indulgent, view of human vice. Of course it may be said that the same applies, at least potentially, to any philosophical system which analyses vice in terms of ignorance. This is true, but there were particular elements in Cynicism, stemming admittedly from its very theoretical deficiencies, which logically imply a fundamentally rather optimistic view of man. In so far, for example, as Cynicism dealt with the problem of evil, it argued (a) that *πόνος* is good for man,¹⁰⁶ and (b) that evil in human beings resulted, ultimately, from the corrupting influence of civilisation. There was thus no place in Cynicism for the dualistic notions that are found in various strands of Platonic and even Stoic thought. Furthermore, Cynicism, unlike Stoicism, asserted the uselessness of conventional *παιδεία* for the acquisition of virtue, and unlike both Stoicism and Epicureanism did not require its doctrine to be supported by elaborate physical theories.¹⁰⁷ In a real, though paradoxical, sense Cynicism was 'easy' (above). The description of Cynicism as a 'short cut to virtue' may be Stoic,¹⁰⁸ but it accurately reflects the Cynic attitude to the problem of the acquisition of virtue. And Cynic virtue is, in the last resort, merely a return to man's natural state.

Thus a Cynic ought, in theory, to be able to say of the undoubtedly corrupt P. Celer: 'He's undoubtedly corrupt, but underneath his corrupt exterior he is a human being and he can be saved'; and to regard his essential (or, from another point of view, his potential) humanity as a saving grace. It must be admitted that such an attitude is infrequently attested in Cynicism, partly, no doubt, because of the general dearth of reliable Cynic *testimonia*, mostly, one suspects, because of the other side of Cynicism—the emphasis on the castigation of vice, a procedure which many Cynics carried out with such gusto as almost to obscure the basically outward-looking and positive character of their philosophy. Nevertheless, there are some texts which expound a basically Cynic view and make such an attitude explicit. For example, Plutarch tells the story of how when Diogenes saw a child eating sweets he struck the child's *παιδαγωγός*, not the child himself, on the ground that the fault lay with him who had failed to teach, not with him who had failed to learn.¹⁰⁹ The historicity of such an anecdote may well be nil, but it may still be *ben trovato*. It is Cynic to condemn the eating of fancy food and the apparently bizarre, but in its own way logical, behaviour of Diogenes is also appropriately Cynic. If, as is the case, the thinking behind Diogenes' behaviour chimes with the theoretical analysis of Cynic attitudes argued for above, the story does have a certain modest evidential value. Or again, in the fourth kingship oration of Dio Chrysostom, the philosophical content of which is mainly Cynic, Alexander the Great is extensively criticised along standard Cynic lines.¹¹⁰ But the defects in Alexander's character are put down to the facts that he is 'young' and has been brought up in a corrupt environment, and it is implied that, because of his innate *φύσις*, or *ἀγαθὸς δαίμων καὶ θεός*, Alexander still possesses 'redeeming' characteristics.¹¹¹ It is true that there are Stoic and Platonic elements in the speech, but the main thrust is Cynic, and again the attitude to Alexander's corruption coheres with the theoretical arguments I have put forward. Similarly in

¹⁰⁴ Cynic emphasis on self-knowledge: cf. e.g. D.L. vi 83; D.Chr. iv 57, x 22, 27; Epict. iii 22.53; Julian Orr. vi 183b, 185a, 188a ff., vii 211b–c.

¹⁰⁵ Cynic 'stripping off': cf. e.g. Str. xv 1.64–5 = Onesicr. *FGrH* 134 F 17; [Diog.] *Epp.* 24, 29.2; D.Chr. iv 66; Lucian *Vit. auct.* 9.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. e.g. D.L. vi 71.

¹⁰⁷ Cynics might exploit physical theories on an *ad hoc* basis (cf. e.g. D.L. vi 73), but by and large they were unimportant to Cynic thought.

¹⁰⁸ It may stem from Apollodorus of Seleucia (D.L.

vii 121 = *SVF* iii, Apoll. Sel. 17), though the description is common in later Cynic texts (e.g. the Cynic letters) and 'road imagery' generally is also a Cynic *τόπος*.

¹⁰⁹ Plut. *an virt. doc. poss.* 439e.

¹¹⁰ For recent discussions of this speech see Jones (n. 41) 120 f. and Desideri (n. 41) 287 ff. and my own forthcoming paper (n. 46). On the philosophical content (which is clearly Cynic) see Höistad (n. 8) 56–63, 154–8, 173 f., 180 f., 187, 202–22. For Cynic attitudes to Alexander cf. n. 46 and below.

¹¹¹ D.Chr. iv 6, 38, 139; cf. Bosworth (n. 97) 4, n. 27.

the Geneva papyrus which recounts the meeting between Alexander and the Gymnosophists we are given a standard Cynic interpretation of this incident.¹¹² But Alexander's reaction to Dandamis' long speech of criticism is interesting: ἡδέως ἤκουσε, καὶ οὐκ ἐθυμώθη· ἐνῆν τι καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ θεῖον πνεῦμα, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ κακοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἔθνους εἰς κακὸν αὐτὸ ἔστησε.¹¹³ As in Dio, the phraseology θεῖον πνεῦμα is Stoic-influenced, but the more important point is that in a generally Cynic context we are given a view of a man corrupted by civilisation,¹¹⁴ yet not devoid of redeeming qualities thanks to his essential humanity. Finally, the Cynic Demonax is explicitly credited with the view ἀνθρώπου . . . εἶναι τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν.¹¹⁵

Now it must be admitted that none of these texts is purely Cynic. It must also be admitted that the Stoics explained vice in terms of mistaken judgements and the corrupting influence of adverse environments¹¹⁶ (as indeed did several other philosophical schools). But these factors do not invalidate my case. That few 'pure' Cynic texts have survived is not surprising. The works of early Cynics like Diogenes had soon passed out of circulation. Many later Cynics may have written nothing, or if they did, their works were not of sufficient interest to survive.¹¹⁷ This makes extrapolation of Cynic doctrine from the orations of Dio Chrysostom or from a work such as Lucian's *Demonax* a task requiring nice judgement, but it does not invalidate the exercise entirely. It is clear that Dio's fourth kingship oration and other of his works are basically Cynic and that Demonax, while not a 'pure' Cynic, nevertheless owed most of his philosophical inspiration to Cynicism.¹¹⁸ It is therefore legitimate to use the evidence from such sources to support a case based on more general theoretical arguments. Again, the fact that the analysis of human vice here argued to be Cynic is also found in Stoic texts (particularly those of the Imperial period)¹¹⁹ does not necessarily indicate that the Cynics were influenced by Stoicism on this question, still less that Cynicism was only a branch of Stoicism. Rather, we should suppose that to a large extent Cynic and Stoic thinking on this question coincided, which, given the general Cynic influence upon Stoic ethics and the increasingly 'Cynic' emphasis of late Stoicism, is precisely what we should expect.

These passages, therefore, support the theoretical arguments already advanced for supposing that Cynicism could take an understanding, even sympathetic, view of human weakness.

(vi) *The practical application of the Cynic understanding of vice*

How can all this be related to the concrete historical situation of the trial of P. Celer in AD 70? Should we assume that, if Demetrius did take this kind of attitude to Celer's corruption, he must

¹¹² *Pap. Génév. inv.* 271; published by V. Martin, *MusHelv* xvi (1959) 77–115; discussion by P. Photiadès, *MusHelv* xvi (1959) 116–39.

¹¹³ Col. ii, 45 ff.

¹¹⁴ Here specifically Greek civilisation: for the defectiveness of Greek civilisation in Cynic texts cf. e.g. D.Chr. viii 12, 15, ix 16, x 30; the theme seems also to be latent in Onesicritus' account of Alexander and the Gymnosophists—cf. Str. xv 1.65. Of course given that the Cynics condemned all civilisation, it is no surprise to find specific condemnation of Greek civilisation in Cynic texts.

¹¹⁵ Lucian *Demonax* 7. Note, incidentally, that one of Demonax' teachers was our Demetrius (*Demonax* 3). We may note also, without overstressing, the fact that a lenient attitude to wrongdoers is quite frequently expressed in the Cynic Letters: cf. e.g. [Diog.] *Ep.* 28.3, 29.2–5; [Heraclit.] *Ep.* 5.3, 7.2.

¹¹⁶ Cf. A. A. Long, 'The Stoic Concept of Evil', *PhilosQ* xviii (1968) 329 ff.

¹¹⁷ Of later Cynic writings those of Dio Chrysostom, Oenomaus, and (in some ways) Lucian are most important. Demetrius probably wrote nothing (though

cf. Kindstrand [n. 1] 93). What the evidential value of Lucian *Vit. auct.* 9 and *Juv.* xiii 121 (both attesting Cynic literature) is I am unsure.

¹¹⁸ Cf. n. 54.

¹¹⁹ The great representative of such 'philanthropic' Stoicism is of course Panaetius (n. 99). Similar views can be found in Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. Seneca: cf. Griffin (n. 24) 179 ff. Epictetus: cf. e.g. *Epict.* i 4, 13.3, 18, 28.10–11, 29.64–5, iii 22 *passim*, esp. 22.23, 22.72, 22.97 f., iii 24.66, 24.79, iv 4.27, 6.2, 12.19, *fr.* 71 Schweighäuser = 25 Oldfather. Marcus Aurelius: cf. e.g. ii 1, 13, iii 4, 11, iv 2, v 28, vi 27, 47, vii 22, 26, 31, 63, 70, viii 8, 14, ix 11, 42, xi 18.3, 18.9, xii 12; discussion in P. A. Brunt, *JRS* lxiv (1974) 11 f. Cf. also Thrasea Paetus' dictum: 'qui vitia odit, homines odit' (Plin. *Ep.* viii 22.3). Quint. i 1.9 = Diogenes of Babylon *fr.* 51 (*SVF* iii 220) is a clear example of a Stoic view that adverse environments are a mitigating (not, of course, a completely exonerating) factor. Note also that Celer's prosecutor Musonius could take a highly 'philanthropic' view of vice (*fr.* 39 Hense), but evidently chose not to in the case of Celer.

have argued on a rather remote philosophical plane? Not necessarily, for it is not difficult to relate this kind of attitude to patterns of thought current in the contemporary political world.

Tacitus attributes a long speech in the senate to Eprius Marcellus in response to Helvidius Priscus' proposal concerning the composition of the delegation to be sent to Vespasian.¹²⁰ How far this speech represents *τὰ ἀληθῶς λεχθέντα* is naturally a ticklish question, but in view of Marcellus' great reputation as a speaker and the importance of the speech Tacitus' rendering may be relatively faithful to the original.¹²¹ The speech is a defence of senatorial collaboration with bad emperors, and as good as concedes that a bad emperor may extort bad behaviour from an enslaved senate. To describe the speech as 'firm and statesmanlike'¹²² is hardly accurate, since on any reasonable interpretation Marcellus was a very nasty piece of work. But such sentiments must have been widely canvassed at the start of Vespasian's reign and not only by scoundrels like Marcellus.¹²³ It is obvious that the corruption of P. Celer could readily have been explained, or excused, along these general lines. But, as I have tried to show, a Cynic like Demetrius, without going as far as Marcellus in his justification of collaboration with a bad emperor, could have argued in an essentially similar way. He could have maintained that although Celer's action was morally wrong and blameworthy, he had been corrupted by an evil political environment, and that his essential humanity should be considered as a mitigating factor.

To sum up. If we suppose (a) that Celer was guilty, as the evidence virtually obliges us to do, and (b) that Demetrius was acting sincerely, which is at least a reasonable starting point, it is perfectly possible to find Cynic justification for his defence of Celer. A Cynic could have felt an obligation to help Celer, either as a philosopher who had gone wrong, or simply as a normal, ignorant human being. The trial could also have provided a Cynic with the opportunity to make a striking and paradoxical demonstration of a philosophical truth and perhaps also to act in the role of Reconciler. A Cynic could have argued that it was unjust to single out Celer for prosecution, and—more important—that although Celer was guilty of a criminal act he had been corrupted by an evil political situation and deserved to be viewed with understanding because of his essential humanity. We cannot of course be sure that these were Demetrius' motives, but it should at least be clear that his defence of Celer *could* have been inspired by motives that were thoroughly humane and honourable, and Cynic through and through.

Two final points. It might be objected that the end result of this lengthy analysis of Cynic attitudes is really rather banal. But such is the nature of Cynicism. Cynic behaviour at its most typical frequently presents problems of precise interpretation, but the basic theoretical propositions of Cynicism are extremely simple. Secondly, is it just misconceived to attempt to analyse a single Cynic act—Demetrius' defence of Celer—in such detail? The answer to this is that in one important respect Cynicism was a very rigorous philosophical system, in that it insisted on the unity of philosophical thought and philosophical action. Hence, if we are prepared to consider the possibility that Demetrius defended Celer in his capacity as Cynic philosopher, we are entitled to expect that we shall be able to find good reasons in Cynicism for such an apparently shocking course of action. There were good Cynic reasons, and Demetrius may have been impelled by them (I like to think he was). At the least we may hope to have clarified some difficulties in a philosophy which was, and is, widely misunderstood, but whose general outlook was in many ways admirable, although it must be admitted that the characteristic Cynic techniques of exposition often tended to obscure the fact. More specifically, we may hope to have shown how a philosophy whose theoretical basis was extremely limited could arrive at a humane and enlightened moral position. It is one of the many apparent paradoxes of Cynicism that for all its crudity it held progressive views on issues we today consider very important (e.g. the equality of the sexes, the breaking down of social barriers, the claims of internationalism over nationalism). In reality these progressive views were a function

¹²⁰ *Hist.* iv 8.

¹²¹ Cf. R. Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford 1958) 187 f.

¹²² Syme 187.

¹²³ As Syme emphasises, Marcellus' views substantially accord with Tacitus' own, in the *Agricola* and elsewhere.

of that crudity, but in the ancient world, as today, it was often not the cleverest and most sophisticated thinkers who held the most enlightened views.

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APPENDIX: THE CONTINUITY OF CYNICISM FROM THE FOURTH CENTURY BC TO THE ROMAN IMPERIAL ERA

Bernays and Zeller believed that in the last two centuries BC Cynicism as a philosophical movement died out and when it revived in the first century AD it had been reborn out of Stoicism.¹²⁴ Dudley challenged this contention and argued that, while Cynicism went through an obscure period in the last two centuries BC, it was never entirely extinguished, so that the Cynicism of the first century AD was indeed part of a continuing tradition of Cynicism, more or less independent of Stoicism. Although the Bernays–Zeller position has been endorsed by a number of distinguished scholars, it is fair to say that most scholars who have recently written about late Cynicism have accepted Dudley's position.¹²⁵

A third view has also been held: that, although Cynicism died out in the last two centuries BC, it revived in the Imperial era independently of Stoicism. This position too has been defended by some distinguished scholars, although it has been much less popular than the other two.¹²⁶ On the face of it it seems implausible that a philosophy which had died out revived spontaneously *ex nihilo*, but the implausibility would be less in the case of Cynicism, which was not a 'school' as such, and whose simple tenets could be grasped by anyone, whether or not there was a continuing tradition to draw upon.

Dudley's case rests upon three main arguments: (a) that there are good reasons why Cynicism should have been eclipsed in the second and first centuries BC; (b) that there are good reasons why it should have revived in the early Imperial era; (c) that there is enough evidence for the continuing existence of Cynicism in the second and first centuries BC. Arguments (a) and (b) go some way towards meeting Bernays' and Zeller's case, though obviously (c) is critical.

(a) Dudley adduces several reasons for the eclipse of Cynicism in the second and first centuries BC:

(1) during that period Cynicism failed to produce any outstanding personalities, which was particularly damaging to Cynicism, since it was not a 'school' as such and lacked a comprehensive theoretical background;

(2) the essential features of the Cynic system, especially the *αὐτάρκεια* and *ἀπάθεια* enjoyed by the *σοφός*, could be found in the much more sophisticated systems of the Stoics and Epicureans;

(3) Cynicism necessarily made less of an impact with the passing of time because it had become familiar;

(4) most important, with the shift in the centre of gravity in the Mediterranean world from Greece to Rome, Cynicism inevitably lost much of its appeal, since it was uncongenial to Roman taste and the Romans already had their own tradition of *antiqua virtus*.

Of course one can question some of the details of this analysis or move the emphasis hither or thither,¹²⁷ but this is a reasonable set of explanations for the apparent decline of Cynicism in the second and first centuries BC, always provided that it is possible to produce some evidence for continuing Cynic

¹²⁴ J. Bernays, *Lucian und die Kyniker* (Berlin 1879) 27 f.; E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* (Leipzig 1923) iii.1 287 f., 791 f.

¹²⁵ Followers of Bernays–Zeller: e.g. J. F. Marcks, *Symbola critica ad epistolographos Graecos* (diss. Bonn 1883) 13 f.; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa²* (Göttingen 1959) i 170 f.; A. A. Long (private letter to me and review of Billerbeck's *Der Kyniker Demetrius*, *JHS* cii [1982] 260); followers of Dudley: e.g. (apart from Kindstrand and Billerbeck) R. Helm, *RE* xii (1924) 5 (anticipating

Dudley); Höistad (n. 8) *passim*; Brunt, *PCPS* xix (1973) 9, (n. 19) 29; Griffin (n. 24) 306; Moles, *JHS* xcvi (1978) 94; Jones (n. 41) 49; Attridge (n. 54) 56 ff.; Malherbe in *Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*, Supp. (New York 1976) 201 ff. and (n. 4) 7.

¹²⁶ Cf. e.g. K. von Fritz in *OCD²* (Oxford 1970) 305.

¹²⁷ Dudley (n. 4) 117 ff.; more could obviously be made of the impact of Stoicism, which borrowed so extensively from Cynic ethics.

activity. One might also suggest that possibly Cynicism did not greatly decline during this period, but that we merely hear little about it, because of the almost total lack of contemporary Greek sources like Dio Chrysostom, Lucian, and Julian, who are so informative about later Cynicism.

(b) Dudley adduces several reasons for the revival of Cynicism in the early Imperial era:

(1) in general 'the conditions which had proved favourable for the growth of Cynicism after the death of Alexander were being repeated in the early years of the first century AD'. More specifically:

(2) the Imperial system had taken the interest out of politics, i.e., presumably, there was a greater need for individual reassurance and comfort;

(3) there was a great increase in cosmopolitanism;

(4) luxury was more rampant than ever—even Stoicism had compromised with it—so Cynicism naturally came into its own.

Again, this is a fair case,¹²⁸ although again one could speculate that the apparent difference between the second and first centuries BC and the early Imperial period is in part a function of the vagaries of the source material. And, accepting that there is some difference, one could add other explanations, e.g. (5) late Cynicism did succeed in producing a number of outstanding individuals (Demetrius, Dio Chrysostom, Demonax, Peregrinus, Oenomaus, Sostratus, and Theagenes); (6) the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Imperial system, in some contrast with that of the Republic, provided Cynics with more specific targets for their political invective; (7) the possibility that some of the more striking Cynic manifestations can be explained in terms of the particular opposition of Alexandrian Cynics to the Flavians; (8) the personal and philosophical links of several leading Cynics with prominent figures of the 'Stoic opposition', which necessarily brought Cynicism more into the public eye.

(c) Dudley's handling of the evidence is generally quite rigorous. He distinguishes Cynic influence upon literature, which obviously might persist after the 'death' of the philosophy that had inspired it, from possible evidence for the continuing existence of Cynicism. Thus he excludes references to Cynicism in Roman comedy (in any case too early to bear on the crucial question) or the alleged 'Cynicism' of Varro. He also distinguishes Cynic mannerisms (exhibited by the street preachers whose existence is attested by Horace, and by Favonius, the follower of Cato the Younger) from Cynicism in the strict sense (both the street preachers and Favonius are described in the tradition as Stoics).¹²⁹ On the Roman side he finds two pieces of evidence that the *κυνικός βίος* was known in Rome, a reference in a mime of Laberius (c. 106–43) to the 'Cynica haeresis' and an alleged reference in Cic. *Acad.* i–ii to the Cynic 'habitus et consuetudo'. On the Greek side, Dudley adduces rather more evidence. He maintains that the 'Cynicism' of Meleager of Gadara is not simply 'literary' Cynicism. He argues that a passage in Diogenes Laertius, deriving probably from Diocles of Magnesia, contemporary and friend of Meleager,¹³⁰ refers to Cynics of Diocles' own day. He points out that an epigram of Antipater of Thessalonica on a degenerate Cynic shows that the 'Cynicus habitus' was known in Greece in the Augustan age. He also instances some of the papyrus literature and Cynic letters as evidence for continuing Cynic literary activity.

Assessment of these items is not easy. The Laberius reference certainly implies the continuing existence of Cynicism in some form or other,¹³¹ as does the epigram of Antipater.¹³² On the other hand, Dudley's inference from Diogenes Laertius is dubious, and the evidence of the various forms of Cynic literature

¹²⁸ Though it is hard to attach much meaning to (3).

¹²⁹ Favonius is so described in Tac. xvi 22.4. J. Geiger argues in *RSA* iv (1974) 167 ff. that Favonius' philosophical allegiance is an open question, given the tendentiousness of the speech Tacitus attributes to Cossutianus Capito in *Ann.* xvi 22. But on *a priori* grounds (strict Cynicism being incompatible with senatorship or public office) Favonius is best classed as a Cynicising Stoic (like, indeed, his friend and inspiration, Cato the Younger).

¹³⁰ D.L. vi 104; the traditional identification of Diocles the doxographer with Meleager's friend is doubted by A. S. F. Gow and D. L. Page, *The Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams* (Cambridge 1965) xvi, but unreasonably.

¹³¹ The implications of the term *αἰρεσις* are exhaustively analysed by J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen 1978) 166 ff. He shows that it does not mean 'school' in an institutional sense, but rather 'school of thought', 'persuasion'. Since the term can refer both to 'schools of thought' *within* different systems of philosophy and to separate systems of philosophy conceived as 'schools of thought' (one can talk e.g. both of *αἰρέσεις* within Stoicism and of Stoicism as a *αἰρεσις*), the description of Cynicism as a *αἰρεσις* tells us nothing about its status in relation to Stoicism.

¹³² Laberius *Compitalia* fr. 3 Ribbeck; Antipater: *AP* xi 158 = Gow–Page, *The Garland of Philip* (Cambridge 1968), Antipater no. 97.

(none securely debatable) proves only the continuing existence of 'literary' Cynicism. More interesting is Dudley's analysis of Meleager. He is, I think, right to argue that to some extent Meleager adopted a Cynic *persona*. In particular, he correctly interprets Meleager's *σκηπτροφόρος σοφία* as a reference to Cynicism. If Meleager represented himself, tongue in cheek, as a Cynic philosopher conquered by Love, this implies the continuing existence of Cynicism in Meleager's lifetime.¹³³

Such a haul (Laberius, Antipater, Meleager) may seem meagre, but given Dudley's case that Cynicism declined sharply in the last two centuries BC without being extinguished entirely, it seems sufficient. Moreover, Dudley could have made more of the Roman evidence. Three well-known passages in Cicero are important:

(1) *de Off.* i 148: 'Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda: est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum.'

(2) *de Off.* i 128, 'nec vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici, qui reprehendunt et irrident, quod ea, quae re turpia non sint, verbis flagitiosa ducamus, illa autem, quae turpia sunt, nominibus appellemus suis.'

(3) *de Fin.* iii 68: 'Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui eiusmodi forte casus inciderit ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo.'

In both *de Off.* and *de Fin.* Cicero is writing in *propria persona*. All three passages imply that Cynicism was an option still available at the time of writing. In the first Cicero is arguing against the flouting of custom. It is no justification of such behaviour to cite the example of Socrates and Aristippus, for they had 'great and almost superhuman personalities'; the Cynic rejection of convention is even worse and should be totally excluded. In the second Cicero is again arguing against Cynic *ἀναίδεια*. The formulation 'Cynici, aut . . . Stoici paene Cynici' is absolutely incompatible with the hypothesis that *all* Cynicism was now part of Stoicism. Nobody denies that there were 'Cynic' Stoics,¹³⁴ but the wording 'Cynics, or Stoics who are almost Cynics' necessarily implies that there were *also* Cynics independent of Stoicism. The same applies to the third passage. Cicero has just been expounding the Stoic view that the wise man should engage in politics and marry and have children; as for the Cynic option (i.e. in context, rejection of politics and of marriage) some Stoics think this justifiable, others not. The argument here is compatible with the hypothesis that a Cynic option remained available to Stoics, but it is also implied that Cynicism still existed *separately* from Stoicism: there is a generic contrast between the mainline Stoic view and the Cynic view. It is true that in rejecting Cynic *ἀναίδεια* and upholding 'verecundia' (*αἰδώς*), Cicero is closely following the teaching of Panaetius.¹³⁵ But in order to avoid the conclusion that these passages, particularly the second, attest the continuing *independent* existence of Cynicism, one would have to suppose that Cicero was following Panaetius so mechanically as to write about Cynicism anachronistically. There is no justification for refusing to accept the natural implications of the Ciceronian evidence.

In short, Dudley seems to have produced enough evidence to demonstrate that Cynicism continued to exist in the last two centuries BC. The Ciceronian evidence also seems to demonstrate that some Cynicism existed separately from Stoicism, although a type of Cynicism was of course also an option within Stoicism.

Finally, a brief look at the Imperial evidence. It is of course possible to adduce texts which make no distinction between Stoicism and Cynicism, as for example Cassius Dio's description of the behaviour of the philosophers in AD 71.¹³⁶ It is also true that a Cynic option continued to be available within Stoicism: that is reflected in some of Seneca's and, perhaps to a greater extent, Epictetus' philosophy. But this does not prove that Cynicism was only an option within Stoicism. In a sense it is true that to Epictetus the true

¹³³ Meleager as 'Cynic': cf. Athen. 157b, 502c; D.L. vi 99; his previous *σκηπτροφόρος σοφία*: AP xii 101 = Gow-Page no. 103. The phrase alludes (*pace* Gow and Page *ad loc.*) to the *σκήπτρον* of Diogenes and his followers (a half-ironic, half-serious description of the Cynic's staff—the emblem of the Cynic 'king'): cf. e.g. [Diog.] *Ep.* 19; Epict. iii 22.34, 22.57, 22.63, iv 8.30, 8.34; Julian *Or.* vi 181b; Apul. *Apol.* 22. Consistent also with the Cynic *persona* are (1) the imitation of Menippus; (2) the cosmopolitan epitaph (AP vii 417 = Gow-Page no. 2); (3) the spoof *Λεκίθου καὶ*

φακῆς σύγκρισις (Athen. 157b).

¹³⁴ For the most important *testimonia* see Billerbeck (n. 1) 4; also relevant are the Cynicising aspects of Zeno's and Chrysippus' teachings (particularly in their *Πολιτεῖαι*).

¹³⁵ Cf. Billerbeck (n. 1) 3 f.

¹³⁶ Cass.D. lxxvi 13.1 ἄλλοι πολλοὶ ἐκ τῶν Στωικῶν καλουμένων λόγων . . . μεθ' ὧν καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ κυνικός . . . (but could this be a case of 'Telemachus and the other suitors'?).

Cynic is a Stoic, because the doctrine of *περὶ κυνισμού* is Stoic. But the doctrine of that work is *also* (apart from Epictetus' rejection of the characteristic Cynic *ἀναίδεια*) Cynic, and it seems to me better to say that *περὶ κυνισμού* shows how Cynicism could be interpreted by a sympathetic Stoic than to claim it as *evidence* that Cynicism was now only a branch of Stoicism.¹³⁷ It is not at all surprising that Stoics like Seneca and Epictetus should have admired, and to a certain degree, attempted to expound, Cynic doctrines: that had always been a possible position within Stoicism.

In the main, the Imperial evidence, like the evidence of the second and first centuries BC, suggests that Stoicism and Cynicism were generally regarded as distinct (subject to the usual reservation that this distinction might be blurred if Stoics 'Cynicised' either in their doctrine or their behaviour, or Cynics exploited some of the philosophical refinements of their sister philosophy).¹³⁸ So, for example, Diogenes Laertius attests a scholarly controversy concerning the status of Cynicism, but the controversy is not whether Cynicism is an offshoot of Stoicism, but whether it is a *αἵρεσις* or an *ἔνστασις βίου*. For Diogenes (or, more important, for his authorities), while there is a close *κοινωνία* between the two philosophies so that some Stoics can recommend Cynicism as a *σύντομος ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδός*, the two are separate.¹³⁹ Similarly, in his *Philosophies for Sale*, Lucian includes both Cynics and Stoics.¹⁴⁰ And Juvenal can write: 'qui nec Cynicos nec Stoica dogmata legit / a Cynicis tunica distantia'.¹⁴¹ The dividing line between the two philosophies is very thin (a mere 'tunica'), but the two are formally distinct (the thought recalls Cicero's in *de Off.* i 128). Of course the 'authority' of Juvenal on such a point means little in itself, but we seem to be dealing with a general, agreed, perception of the relationship between the two philosophies. (Elsewhere, we find Cynics attacking Stoic doctrine.)¹⁴² The evidence of Seneca is also interesting. For all Seneca's exposition (on occasion) of 'Cynic' views, and his use of Demetrius as a philosophical ideal, he clearly regards Cynicism and Stoicism as separate. For example, in *de Ben.* ii 17 he discusses first the Cynic attitude to the receiving of money, but in ii 17.3 he expounds the view of 'Chrysippus noster': he is making (or implying) a generic distinction between two philosophies. Or, in *de brev. vit.* 14.2 he writes: 'disputare cum Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicuro quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere'. The Socratic circle, the sceptical Academy of Carneades, Epicureanism, Stoicism, Cynicism—to Seneca Stoicism and Cynicism are distinct, even though the influence the latter had exerted, and continued to exert, upon the former, was profound. The evidence is decisive that this is the correct position.¹⁴³

¹³⁷ As (e.g.) Prof. Long argues. We might also recall that Epictetus, like Dio Chrysostom (sometimes) and Julian, simultaneously upholds a Cynic ideal and attacks so-called 'degenerate' Cynics. In reality of course the behaviour of these 'degenerate' Cynics was truer to the original Cynic spirit than was the ideal *Κυνικός* of bowdlerising Stoics, and the attacks upon these Cynics might be taken to imply the existence of a type of Cynicism *outside* Stoicism.

¹³⁸ Cf. n. 4.

¹³⁹ D.L. vi 103–4 (*αἵρέσεις* meaning 'school of thought', but here referring to separate systems of philosophy: cf. n. 131).

¹⁴⁰ *Vit. auct.* 7 ff., 20 ff.

¹⁴¹ Juv. xiii 121 f.

¹⁴² E.g. Oenomaus (cf. n. 4).

¹⁴³ Note also that the Cynic Epistles consistently project Cynicism as a distinct 'philosophy' (cf. e.g. [Crates] *Ep.* 16.1, 29.1).